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THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN
PUBLIC RANGE MANAGEMENT*

B. Delworth Gardner**

Introduction
Economic analysis has a vital, if not
indispensable, role to play in the management decisions
of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM} if the national
welfare is to be served effectively. This rather
sweeping conclusion is justified by the nature of the
management problems faced by the BLM and by the unique
view of the world provided by the field of economics.
The approach of this paper will be to describe
briefly some of the intellectual bases of economics and
then to apply them to the more significant management
issues faced by the BLM: land use planning, multiple
use philosophy, grazing fees, and range improvement
analysis. This discussion is meant to be an overview
of a rather wide spectrum of issues, and not a
detailed, complete and, therefore, satisfying treatment
of any of them. Following papers in this workshop, as
well as those in other workshops in this series, will
provide needed depth in an empirical problem-oriented
context.
Another goal of this paper is to identify
significant economic problems that presently are
receiving inadequate attention by the BLM, or by anyone
else for that matter.
Finally, in the last section of the paper, the
BLM's capability to make the envisioned analyses will
be investigated and a few recommendations will be
advanced.
Economics and Societal Welfare
Let us begin by attempting to circumscribe
economics as it is commonly understood. What
*Giannini Foundation Research Paper no. 626.
**Department of Agricultural Economics, University of
California, Davis
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distinguishes it from other academic disciplines and
fields of learning? What are the central human
problems that it attempts to elucidate and solve?
Jacob Viner, a celebrated economic theorist and
historian, once equipped that "economics is what
economists do." This statement is circular and not at
all helpful in delimiting the boundaries of economics.
It may be quite revealing, however, in hinting that
economists have broadened their interests considerably
through time as the discipline has matured, and as
economists strayed into the sacrosanct domain of other
fields such as political science, sociology,
psychology, anthropology, engineering, and even
biology. It might be added that economists have not
generally been welcomed with open arms by these
disciplines as they have employed their maximizing
behavioral models, founded on "unrealistic" assumptions
of happiness seeking consumers and profit maximizing
firms.
Foremost, economics is a positive science that
attempts to explain the behavior of economic agents,
i.e., the domain of "what is." Implications of
economic theory are tested in the empirical realm to
determine the validity of the theory. But economics is
also a normative science--a body of knowledge about
"what ought to be." In this realm, economics
prescribes behavior that is required·to reach certain
goals deemed to be desirable, e.g., efficient resource
allocation, full employment, price level stability,
etc.
Perhaps the definition of economics that is most
widely used in our textbooks nowadays is the one
advanced by Robbins five decades agoi namely, the
economic problem involves the allocation of scarce
means among alternative or competing ends (Robbins,
193 2).
As James Buchanan elaborated (Buchanan, 1979), "the
problem is one of allocation made necessary by the fact
of scarcity, the necessity to choose." Ever since
Robbins' seminal work, economists have devoted much
energy to the problems raised by scarcity, broadly
considered, and to the necessity for the making of
allocation decisions.
In his critique of Robbins, Buchanan believes that
the discipline has veered off track in viewing
economics as a set of problems centering on allocation.
Buchanan's view is that economics is a characteristic
form of human activity that occurs in a "whole network
of evolving exchanges, bargains, trades, side payments,
agreements, and contracts," where there are gains to be
made from mutually beneficial trade. Buchanan further
argues that the emphasis on allocation as the problem
has led us to optimization models that amount to little
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more than exercises in applied mathematics where the
~3jor improvements of late have come in the form of
computing techniques and the mathematics of social
engineering. Buchanan's sense is that economics should
concern itself more with the positive behavior of
economic agents as they interact to solve society's
economic problem. In short, economics should be
concerned more with testing behaviorist hypotheses and
less with generating normative rules for maximizing
this and that.
Politics is also vitally concerned with resource
allocation and thus overlaps with economics in its
traditional concerns. Buchanan provides a useful
distinction:
Economics is the study of the whole system of
exchange relationships. Politics is the study
of the whole system of coercive or potentially
coercive relationships. In almost any
particular social institution, there are
elements of both types of behavior, and it is
appropriate that both the economist and the
political scientist study such institutions
(Buchanan, 1979, p. 34).
An implication of the discussion above deserves
emphasis and elaboration at this point. If economics
is concerned with exchange and trade, it is apparent
that more than dollar-value variables are relevant in
the choices to be made. The terms of trade
incorporated in a given choice will almost always
include a host of nonmonetary factors: freedom,
comfort, altruism, fidelity, beauty, etc., which
impinge on the exchange transaction. To the extent
that these attributes can be defined and measured they
constitute no problem in terms of explaining positive
behavior. They do, however, create some considerable
consternation to the economist who is working with
normative optimization models. These models maximize
or minimize monetary variables such as profits, costs,
or rents and if the causal variables are not
quantifiable in these terms they are difficult to
include in models of this kind.
I believe that there is a wide agreement among
economists, however, as to what are the two most
significant economic issues: economic efficiency and
distributional equity. Under the economic optimization
paradigm, efficiency means getting the most output from
the limiting resources, using the "best" combination of
inputs--employing inputs in their highest valued uses.
Nearly all productive activity, however, eventuates in
both "goods" and "bads1" the "goods" consisting of
consumable products that add to human satisfaction and
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the "bads," generally in the form of waste, that
detract from it. The allocative goal of productive
activity for a given time period is to maximize the net
benefit from the "goods" and the "bads;" and at the
same time, to leave the resources unimpaired in their
productive potential. If there is to be efficiency,
then returns to like units of outlay must be equalized
at the margins--that is, efficiency requires that
inputs be used up to the point that their value in use
(their contribution to output) exactly equals what they
are paid.
In the case of temporal allocation of capital
stock resources, the goal to be sought is to allocate
resources through time such that the net worth of the
capital stock at any moment of decision is a maximum.
It is important to recognize that the stock of capital
includes resources in the natural environment such as
land, water, air, trees, renewable vegetation, etc.
Which brings us to an all important concept in
economics that lies at the heart of allocative
efficiency: opportunity cost. The opportunity cost,
or simply cost in its economic meaning, of producing
commodity Xis the value of the resources (inputs in
production) used to produce X in their best alternative
employment (i.e., where they could have been used to
produce something other than X). Thus, the cost of
using resources in the public sector is their highest
valued employment in the private sector. Or, the cost
of using range improvement funds in spraying brush is
the foregone value of forage that could have been
produced by spending the funds for reseeding, if
reseeding represents the most productive alternative
use of the funds. The applications of the concept are
nearly limitless, and opportunity cost more than any
other concept represents the way an economist views the
world.
Economic theory posits a relationship between
output and the inputs used in the production process
that can be represented as a frontier constituting the
best that can be done with the resources and technology
available. Allocative efficiency is concerned with the
choice of the best point on the production frontier.
Leibenstein (1966) has argued that allocative
efficiency is not so important in reaching maximum
production as is a notion he calls X-efficiency.
Rather than shifting resources about from uses and time
periods of lower net value to higher ones until net
returns are equal, X-efficiency measures actual
economic performance compared to the theoretical
frontier. That is, it attempts to account for the
disparity between actual output and potential output
that would result from the best technology available
and the most ideal institutional environment and
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incentive structure in which economic choices are made.
In explaining the real growth in the economy through
time, X-efficiency is alleged to swamp allocative
efficiency in importance. The evidence is not all in,
however, and economists will continue to study and
debate these issues.
Equity in the distribution of income and wealth is
the second great issue in economics. What factors
determine the distributional shares of economic product
captured by various economic agents who contribute to
economic output? Property rights are obviously
critical. Some government policies that affect this
distribution, such as the progressive income tax, were
designed to redistribute income and wealth more
equally.
In the context of this discussion, two points are
worth noting. In terms of a positive analysis of "what
is," equity problems are just as amenable to scientific
analysis as are efficiency problems. That is, it is no
less scientific to analyze the impact of the BLM's
grazing fee policy on the distribution of rancher
incomes than it is to analyze its impact on the
allocative efficiency of forage among ranchers. But
there is a basic difference between efficiency and
equity criteria in the normative sense of "what ought
to be." By definition, allocative efficiency is
"good." More net output of a useful product must be
better than less. In the case of equity, however, it
is impossible to prove that one income distribution is
"better" than another without making interpersonal
comparisons of levels of satisfaction. But because
satisfaction is personal and subjective, there is
no objective way of demonstrating that a more
egalitarian distribution is better than one less so,
although it is often assumed to be so.
For our purposes here it is sufficient to
differentiate between efficiency and equity problems
and to indicate that both are legitimate subjects for
economic inquiry. The more normative equity issues,
however, tend to be more political since they cannot be
settled by positive analysis. In addition, they are
very visible. In fact, politics is chiefly concerned
with power brokering as groups attempt to increase
their share of economic product in a largely zero-sum
game. Zero-sum means that transferring income does not
change the total income to be allocated. Anderson and
Hill (1981) have argued that income transfer is a
negative-sum game since resources are required to
effectuate the transfers. Achieving greater economic
efficiency permits the game to be positive sum so that
at least theoretically (assuming some scheme to
compensate losers) some economic agents can be better
off with none left worse off.
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Tradeoffs between efficiency and equity create some
difficult management problems for government agencies
such as the BLM. Pressures mount for policies to
achieve equity goals. The rub is that often, if not
always, these policies tend to be inefficient. How
much net economic product is sacrificed in the struggle
for larger income shares by special interest groups?
Can't the equity goals be reached in ways less
injurious to efficiency and thus leave all better off?
In my view, these are the most compelling questions
that require answering by competent economic analysis,
either done in the agency itself or hired externally.
These questions of efficiency and equity will recur
time and again in the following discussion of Bureau
management and policy.
Economics and Management Issues Facing the Bureau of
Land Management
Some historical perspective of public land disposal
and management would put the current set of issues in a
useful context but space and time constraints will not
permit. Besides, Robert Nelson in the Office of Policy
Analysis (Nelson, 1980) is well underway with a project
to provide this perspective. The Bureau is operating
under a new and different set of statutory and
administrative guidelines now than was the case prior
to the passage of FLPMA in 1976. Let us proceed by
identifying some of the critical economic issues faced
by the Bureau under the current legal and
administrative mandates and discuss the efficiency and
equity implications.
Jurisdictional Control and Ownership of Public Lands
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA) has been called the BLM's Organic Act. It
provided legislative recognition that BLM is more than
a custodial manager of the nation's largest block of
the public lands until they are finally disposed of.
The Act mandates that the public lands will be retained
in federal ownership unless it can be shown that
disposal would serve the national interest.
It is ironic that despite FLPMA, the greatest
challenges to continuing federal control and ownership
of the public domain lands have occurred since 1976.
Most of the significant public land states have
recently passed "Sagebrush Rebellion" laws proposing to
shift ownership and control of the public lands to the
states. Two states, Utah and New Mexico have published
studies (Le Baron et al., 1980) that indicate that
state management ofthe public lands may indeed be
feasible. Other states are sure to follow with similar
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st lld i es , if they have not al eady, and they are likely

to re ch similar conclusions. The issues are complex
and the empicical problems of measur~ng costs and
benefits of state management are formidable ,. Because
the "economic rentsn rom energy development are so
huge , th stakes are high and it is not clear at th·s
point exactly how or when the issue will be settled.
Other ar-guroents can be advanced for trans ferring
ownership artd control of the publi~ lands o the
private sector (Baden and Stroup, 1973). There is much
appeal in the ass.e rt ion that the private market is the
most efficient mechanism ever invented by man. to
channel productive resources into those uses most
satisfying to consumers and to induce the suppl_y of
optimal quantities of productive reso urces to
prof it able product ion. Government enterprise has been
shown to be notoriously inefficient on both counts
since the rigors of market competition do not penalize
inefficiency .

Much work remains to be done by economists on these
ques ions. The efficiency guest o.ns are paramount .
What are the outputs that might be produced on the
public lands and what ar·e they worth? How does "value"
get established if competitive market prices are
unavail~ble? Wha inputs are needed to produce the
outputs, and hat net benefits are foregone if these
inputs are used on the pubic lands rather than
else here in the economy'? What outputs and inputs are
incapa.ble of being "priced" according to their "-social 11
value, and can public or private enterprise best
account. for t.hese "ext ernalit1es 11 ? Externalities ar.e
unpriced effects on third parties not accounted for in
negotiated mar et transact ions. What outputs, if any,
would not get produced at all by the private sector
sine they are "public" goods and thus it is impossible
to restrict their consu..mption in an exchange market?
How ine ff· cient is the legislative budget process in
providing capital and human resources in optimal
quantities for efficient development and management of
the public lands? And how serious are allega ions o f
"government f ai 1ure;" i.e. , the lack of incentives in
government enterprise for bureaucrats to acquire
management expertise , or to invoke management and
product ion dee is ions that satisfy the interests o f
clien el groups rather than hose of the burea1.1crats?
These are only a few of the quest ions that economists
mus ask and answer if public decisi ons on the
ownership and management of the public lan.ds are to be
informed .and efficient.
Li~ewise, the equity quest ions in s ·t ate vs feder·al
ownership are of t.t'emendous concern. Many fear that
state governments would prove to be far more
susceptible to influence peddling by powerful economic
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interests than is the federal government and,
therefore, would shift resource use to favor those
interests. Is it true and, if true, is it bad? Others
believe that local interests should be given greater
weight in management decisions than they are now and
that local managers, responsible to a local
constituency, are likely to make better decisions than
those whose constituency is nationwide. After all, it
is in Washington where the major centers of power are,
and it is there where lobbying has reached such high
intensity. This does not suggest that lobbying per se
is all bad, but there is no doubt that users of the
public lands have very disparate representation by
lobbyists in Washington. These questions are far from
settled and much more solid research needs to be done
by social scientists of all stripes, but especially by
economists.
Land Use Planning and Multiple Use Management
FLPMA specifies that the Federal lands are to be
managed under multiple-use principles and in a manner
which will protect the quality of the resources and the
environment. While the act may have established the
legitimacy of multiple use as a legal and a management
principle, and thus may make it more difficult for
politically potent groups to obtain exclusive use
privileges, there are many unresolved operational
questions about multiple use that require answering
before implementation of land-use plans.
Recognition needs to be given to the fact that the
BLM's management problem is more than one of allocating
forage among competing uses. Many uses of the public
lands are only indirectly related to forage
availability, if at all. Mineral and energy production
below the land surface are obvious cases in point. So
are preservation of historical sites and endangered
species and some forms of recreation. What are the
useful products, broadly construed to include
amenities, that can be produced on the public lands?
What are the resources required to produce them. Are
they competitive for resources or do they complement
each other? What are their "values" to users? How
does production affect the resource base in terms of
its potential for future productivity? All of these
questions must be answered before an "efficient" mix of
products can be determined, and before the "efficient"
quantity of the mix can be established.
Posing these questions this way raises an even more
fundamental issue: how relevant is an efficiency
criterion in the first place as a guide for resource
use decisions on public lands? My own view is that it
is highly relevant. In the first place, efficient
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production maximizes the difference between the value
0f output produced by scarce resources and its costs.

An ethos exists in our society that this is a good
thing. Perhaps even more important is the requirement
that production pass a benefit-cost test; this imposes
a certain rigor on the planning process itself. If not
maximum net output, then what level? Who is to decide
and by what standards? Are we to leave the
resource-use decisions to the whim of the land manager
without firm management criteria and accountability?
To do so opens Pandora's box and subjects him to
pressure, cajolery, and threats that are inimical to
effective management.
As for multiple use, it is a term that may have
some rhetorical or legal value but is rather amorphous
in its implementation unless guided by efficiency
critieria. It suggests that more than one user or
class of users have valid claims to land use. Thus,
user classes that are themselves struggling for
survival on a given parcel of public land such as
miners, energy producers, or ranchers love the term.
But multiple use is of little help to the managers in
deciding the optimal mix of many uses that are
competitive for resources in one way or another.
Efficiency criteria that prompt resource shifts from
uses of lower marginal social value to higher ones
obviously constitute a planning tool that gives
unambiguous directions to resource allocation so long
as the requisite information on what the values are is
available. Of course, other criteria could be and are
used in place of efficiency criteria, if the latter are
considered too narrow or too crass or whatever. My
point is that efficient management would be promoted if
the criteria were unambiguous and that multiple use is
anything but clear and unambiguous.
Vegetation Allocation, Range Improvement, and User
Fees
In principle, the forage allocation decision has
the same efficiency and equity dimensions as the land
allocation decision. Forage is allocated to livestock,
wildlife, small mammals, insects, watersheds, etc. In
some cases, market prices exist that reflect use values
rather well and in other cases they do not. Economists
have made progress in simulating market prices for some
uses such as wildlife and watershed where products and
yields are well defined, but to my knowledge have made
little progress in valuing forage going to small
mammals, insects, and especially endangered species.
Professor Dyer's paper at this workshop discusses this
issue.
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It is in the area of grazing of livestock that
efficiency and equity conflicts are especially evident,
and special attention will be given to this use
primarily because the regulations are well developed
and several studies have been made.
Grazing regulation #4110.1 specifies that "to
qualify for grazing use on the public lands an
applicant must be engaged in the livestock business,
(and} must own or control land or water base property
• • • " It is difficult to quarrel with the requirement
that an applicant must be engaged in the livestock
business since almost by definition a livestock grazer
would be in the livestock business in one way or
another. It is the "ownership of base property"
requirement that creates an efficiency-equity conflict.
This is the well known "commensurability" requirement
that is more explicit in the eligibility prerequisites
of the Forest Service than those of the BLM. This
requirement eliminates from consideration for permits
the "itinerant" stockman who may own no base property
but may be very efficient in the use of the forage. It
also effectively eliminates any rancher who may not be
fully commensurable in the eyes of the federal range
manager.
My own research (Gardner, 1962a} many years ago
showed that this policy is inefficient and has
misallocated forage among ranchers. Then why has the
policy persisted for over 40 years? I believe it is
because of a mistaken view that only base property
owners are bonafide stockmen; that if this eligibility
requirement were eliminated the industry would be
somehow unstable.
The question of stability of the industry is raised
in regulation 4110.2-3 in connection with the transfer
of grazing preferences; "Approval of the tranfer shall
not disrupt the stability of the livestock industry in
the general area within which the public lands involved
are located." No hints as to what is meant by
"stability" are given. We can assume, I believe, that
it is the wealth positions of livestock operators and
those that sell inputs to the industry and market and
transport the output that are being protected by this
regulation. If so, it is a regulation that is oriented
around equity concerns rather than those of efficiency.
In any case, I know of no empirical evidence that
eliminating the current eligibility requirements would
create an unstable industry or local economy.
Let me now turn to the issue of the level of the
grazing fees. Until recent years the fees were set
well below the value of the forage. Were there no
eligibility requirements for obtaining grazing
privileges, the demand would have exceeded the supply.
Therefore, some rationing mechanism had to be employed
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to allocate the forage and the eligibility requirements
were imposed. It is easy to rationalize the
requirements that were selected. Conflict would be
minimized by allocating the privileges to the ranchers
who grazed the land before the Taylor Act was passed,
and it was they who generally had the local base
property.
There can be no question that the old Grazing
Service had some delicate political problems on its
hands as it brought previously unregulated grazing
under control. Not surprisingly, the ranchers who had
grazed the public range for free strongly resisted the
imposition of even the low fees. Many were pioneers
who were largely responsible for the area's settlement
and development. A policy that was not equitable to
them in the circumstances would have very little chance
of being implemented. The policy of low fees and
commensurable base property was reasonably fair to the
original permittees but ultimately produced a set of
inefficient regulationsi a classical efficiency--equity
t radeoff.
This set of issues is still very much alive. Under
the spur of recent legislation the government has been
riding hard to charge livestock grazers the "fair
market" value for forage. "Fair market" value is
usually defined to mean what the forage would be worth
if it were allocated in private and competitive
markets. The rationale for this policy usually
advanced is that the public owners of the range
resources should receive its fair value so as to avoid
subsidizing specific user groups, who have been
subsidized for a long time anyway. In other words,
equity requires that tenant users pay full value. Much
of the debate has centered on what is "fair market"
value and whether or not it costs the rancher more to
run stock on the public range than on comparable
private ranges from which monthly rentals are available
that might be used as the indicator of fair value.
(See Godfrey's paper in this volume for further
discussion.) Part of this controversy turns on whether
or not the permit value itself should be included as a
cost of public grazing. The government has always
insisted that the permit is a privilege and not a right
and therefore has no legitimate value. As if a
government edict or even a legislative statute could
repeal the inexorable workings of the market. Permit
values were generated by government policies that
priced the grazing below its value and gave the
ranchers at least some security of future use, both of
which are necessary conditions for the permits taking
on a value.
What are the efficiency implications of charging
"fair market" fees in the name of equity to public
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landowners. The grazing fee, like any price, has
distinct efficiency as well as equity implications.
These are too often neglected in range policy
discussions, partially because scientists and
especially economists have not analyzed sufficiently
the efficiency consequences of setting the fee at
different levels.
It is my sense that the eligibility requirements
for holding permits misallocate grazing services more
than the level of the fee charged. Let me try to
demonstrate why this is so. Suppose the fee were set
below the value of forage in livestock grazing. If
transfers of permits were unrestricted, permits would
take on a value that would represent the capitalized
differential between the annual competitive value of
the forage and the annual grazing fee. So long as the
differential existed, the permits would have a market
value and would be bought by the most efficient users.
Thus the level of the fee would be innocuous in its
allocative impacts. If the fee were raised to the
competitive value of the forage, however, the permit
value would go to zero and the fee would become binding
in its allocative effects. Only the most efficient
users could afford to pay the fee and would thus obtain
the permit. Thus, one way of ascertaining whether or
not fees are approaching competitive levels is to
observe how much interest there is in acquiring
permits. Another is the degree to which ranchers opt
for nonuse of the preference which they do hold. If
the grazing preference is unused over several grazing
seasons the suspicion must be raised that the fee
exceeds the net value of the forage to the grazer.
Given the eligibility requirements that at least
partially ration the permits to qualified ranchers, the
level of the fee simply determines the annual "economic
rent" (revenue minus variable costs) captured by the
eligible permittees who hold the permits and at the
same time contributes to determining the value of the
permit itself (Roberts, 1963). This, of course, is the
equity issue and it arises because fees have
historically been "low" as argued above. Even with the
costs of maintaining the eligibility requirements, such
as commensurability and land ownership, differentials
between the fee and forage value have been large enough
to support substantial permit values in most areas. If
the government raises the fee, the permit value falls
below what it otherwise would be and the rancher
suffers a wealth loss. If he actually purchased the
permit at a higher price with debt the wealth loss may
also create a cash flow problem for him. If he has
always held the permit or inherited it, the wealth loss
may not cause so much stress, but is a real loss
nevertheless. In terms of what is fair, does it make
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sense to raise fees to shift more of the economic rent
to the public owners, and thus impose wealth losses on
ranchers, many of whom have incomes below the national
average?
Given that the eligibility requirements cause
inefficient allocation of grazing preferences, and fee
levels at fair market values seem to be inequitable to
ranchers what should be done? My proposal (Gardner,
1963a} nearly twenty years ago seems just as applicable
today as it did then. In brief, the proposal called
for the creation of perpetual permits for a given
quantity of grazing to be determined by the Bureau,
relying on the best scientific evidence available on
range condition and competing multiple use demands.
These permits would be issued to ranchers who presently
hold permits in exchange for those now in use. These
permittees would be completely free to retain or to
dispose of the new permits to whomever they wished, for
whatever price could be negotiated.
Prudent management may require changing the
quantity of forage allocated to grazing from time to
time. If additional AUM's become available because of
permittee investment or management, the permittee would
be allowed to harvest them at the set fee. If new
allotments were created on land previously ungrazed the
new permits could be sold at auction. If grazing
needed to be permanently reduced, the government could
simply buy up the permits in the market. This policy
may seem inequitable on its face. After all, why
should the government buy back permits it had freely
given away? Because this is one way of avoiding the
imposition of wealth losses on the 80-85 percent of
permit holders who have purchased permits from other
ranchers. It was the government policy of underpricing
grazing along with re-issuing permits to buyers of
permitted cattle and dependent base property that gave
rise to permits taking on capital value.
The equity problem relating to the level of the fee
could be quite easily solved. If the fee were set at
the value of the grazing, the permits would have no
value and a market for them could not function. If set
at a "low" level the new perpetual permits would have a
higher value than the old ones given the reduced
uncertainty of the new permit system. It follows that
at some fee level the new permits would be worth, on
the average, exactly what the old ones are now. To
avoid windfall gains or losses to current permit
holders, the government should try to ascertain what
this fee level would be and charge it. Thereafter, the
fee should be fixed in real terms to move with some
"reasonable" price index so as to avoid future wealth
gains and losses to ranchers and the public land
owners.
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Baden (1980) has presented a slightly different
approach:
There is, however, an alternative that
captures the benefits of private ownership,
generates revenue for the public treasury and
does not violate standards of equity • • • •
First, separate the grazing from the other
values such as mineral and wildlife. Second,
calculate the discounted present value of the
permit. One would calculate the present
value of the income stream to the federal
treasury that would be produced by the
permit. Data for this computation are either
currently available or can be established by
a simple decision involving the determination
of future fees. Third, allow present
permittees to purchase property rights in the
grazing resource at the above figure. If the
present permittees do not want to exercise
their option, then these rights can be put up
for auction.
Both Gardner and Baden proposals approach the
efficiency problem by creating markets for permits
where they can move to the most efficient grazers
without restriction. They approach the equity problem
somewhat differently. Baden's system is equitable since
ranchers pay the present value of future fees in order
to purchase the grazing rights and thus are no worse
off. The government does not lose by selling the
permits to grazers at the discounted estimated future
fees that would have been collected. Gardner's system
is equitable in charging fees that would leave ranchers
just as well off as they are now. Which of the two, or
some modification of each, is superior needs to be
searchingly analyzed. Baden's proposal involves
private ownership of grazing rights; Gardner's only a
free market in government owned grazing preferences.
Other grazing regulations that promote equity at
the same time probably reduce efficiency. Regulation
4110.4-2 indicates that where a decrease in public land
acreage available for livestock grazing necessitates
reductions or cancellations in grazing preferences,
that the cancellations will be equitably apportioned by
the authorized officer. It is not exactly clear what
•equitably apportioned" means. The reduction would be
efficient if the officer could cancel out the
preferences of the highest cost grazers.
Regulation 4110.5 indicates what applicants will be
eligible for any additional forage that might become
available. Among the factors to be considered are: a)
Historical use of the public land, b) Proper range

15

management and use of water for livestock, and c)
~eneral needs of the applicants' livestock operations.
Items b) and c) may be related to efficiency as well as
to equity, but they are by no means equivalent to it.
Regulation 4120.6-1 states: "The authorized
officer may require a permittee or lessee to install,
maintain, and/or modify range improvements on the
public lands." Given all the problems with security of
tenure, the history of grazing reductions, and rising
grazing fees, this seems an astounding requirement and
must seem onerous to stockmen if taken literally on its
face. I have been told by officials in the Bureau,
however, that the regulation is applied only when a
majority of ranchers wish to proceed with a range
improvement project benefitting all, but there are one
or more holdouts who wish to be "free riders." This
means they could profit from the investment of others
without paying their fair share. Thus, they are
required to participate. Interpreted in this way I
have no objection to the regulation since the
requirement conduces to efficiency as well as equity.
Equity is also an issue relative to multiple use.
Some users of forage such as livestock grazers pay
fees, and as indicated above there is now considerable
pressure to raise them to "fair market" value. Other
indirect forage users such as hunters and fishermen pay
a license fee, although the amount paid is hardly a
reflection of the average value of the service
provided by the federal land and/or water resources and
besides does not accrue to the federal government.
Other users such as watershed beneficiaries and many
types of recreationists and environmentalists pay
nothing at all. Often representatives of these groups
are the most vociferous advocates that livestock
grazers ought to pay fees that represent the full fair
market value.
This is not an easy issue to resolve. It may be
quite infeasible to price some uses of the public
lands. Prime examples are the so-called "public"
commodities or services (Samuelson, 1954) those that
are nonrival in consumption and where access to users
is difficult or impossible to control. Public land
used for open space and for its aesthetic quality
(Gardner, 1977) is a good example. Open space exists
tor all to enjoy and consumption is nonrival so long as
congestion does not occur. If unrestricted
transportation roads pass through open space, access is
uncontrolled and use charges are probably infeasible
because it would be difficult and costly to collect
them. To be perfectly clear, this discussion is not an
argument for pricing commodities that qualify as public
goods. It is simply a statement of fact that equity
problems will always exist when some users are required
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to pay for benefits received from using the public
lands and others are not.
My sense is that both efficiency and equity goals
would be well-served, however, if competitive pricing
were utilized to the full extent that it can be; i.e.,
for all nonpublic goods. Equity would be well-served
if consumers of public goods could be taxed to the
point that tax revenues would at least cover the cost
of supplying the public good. Of course, this assumes
that consumers can be identified and costs can be
determined, neither of which is easy or costless.
Unfortunately, no taxation scheme is completely neutral
in its impacts on economic efficiency and thus a more
equitable policy might well be one that is less than
perfectly efficient. Such is the nature of many
efficiency-equity tradeoffs.
Range Improvements
The efficiency-equity dilemma is also well
illustrated in the matter of investment in range
improvements on the public lands. Many studies over
the last three decades have shown that it is
economically feasible to invest in range improvements,
particularly on private lands (Nielsen, 1981; Gardner,
1962b). Reported rates of return in these studies have
been extremely variable and I have shown (Gardner,
1963b) that most of the variability of studies
completed before 1963 is attributable to the methods
used to calculate profitability rather than to
differences in the basic data showing costs and
returns. Dr. Workman's paper following this one will
focus on some of these issues relating to economic
feasibility and ranking alternative projects.
In range improvement, economic efficiency is
enhanced if two conditions are met: (1) if the
resources utilized in the improvement practice have net
economic yields higher than those in their best
alternative use, and (2) in terms of project scale and
durability, if scarce resources are utilized in the
improvement project until the marginal value of
increasing scale or durability is just equal to the
marginal value of the resources in their best
alternative. If yields are higher in range improvement
than in alternative uses then "under-investment" in
range improvements is indicated. This is precisely
what most of the studies on private lands tend to show.
But there the situation is relatively uncomplicated.
Property rights are fairly secure, and if the
investment produces more forage the rancher can raise
the stocking rate and utilize any grazing system he
wishes to take the forage.
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The situation is vastly more complex on the public
lands. The question of economic feasibility is much
more complicated where multiple use is mandated and
multiple products must be evaluated. When the amount
and/or the composition of vegetation is changed many of
the multiple uses are affected, some positively and
some probably negatively. These must somehow be
evaluated in aggregate if economic feasibility is to be
determined. At first blush it would appear that
economists in the Bureau have the perspective and
information to make the most adequate studies. As
Workman points out, however, the problem is that there
are strong incentives in the bureaucracy to justify all
projects by whatever means necessary so that investment
funds can be acquired. Sometimes this is hard to do
when increases in forage are allocated to uses other
than livestock grazing, especially to those uses that
are difficult to quantify in monetary terms.
Cost-sharing between the agency and the rancher
will seldom generate the most efficient quantity of
investment funds, especially under present regulations.
The rancher perceives several problems. Suppose the
improvement practice does generate increases in forage.
What guarantee does he have that he will be allowed to
graze it, given the heavy pressures from the multiple
users who are also demanding more? It is possible, of
course, that his investment might forestall future
grazing reduction? How can he be sure when the
multiple use decisions are entirely in the hands of
agency managers and there are no legally binding
guarantees? For many years the agencies have been
reluctant to allow private investment on the public
lands, supposedly because it would give the investors
greater leverage in forage allocation decisions and
reduce the manager's authority to make needed
reductions in stocking rates or changes in season of
use.
Grazing regulations of the Bureau appear to
encourage the permittees to make investments:
#4120.6-3 states that any permittee may apply for a
range improvement permit to install, use, maintain,
and/or modify range improvements that are needed to
achieve management objectives and that the permittee
shall provide full funding. The regulation adds that
the permittee shall have title to removable
improvements authorized under the range improvement
permit.
The question at issue is whether or not these
regulations provide sufficient incentives for
"efficient" private investment as defined above. There
are reasons stated in the regulations themselves that
cast some doubt. Grazing regulation #4120.6-2
specifies that "Any permittee or lessee may enter into
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a cooperative agreement with the BLM for the
installation, use, maintenance, and/or modification of
range improvements needed to achieve management
objectives within his designated allotment." So far so
good! Regulation 4120.6-2 also states that the United
States will have title to range improvements produced
by a cooperative agreement between the permittee and
the U.S. government, and that acquisition of a range
improvement permit or participating in a cooperative
agreement does not convey to the permittee right,
title, or interest in any lands or resources held by
the United States. Regulation 4120.6-6 goes on to
indicate that "range improvements shall not be removed
from the public lands without authorization." It must
be quite obvious that lack of a clear title to range
improvements and required authorization for removal
must impair incentives for improvement investment.
Besides, most improvements (fences, water developments,
vegetation conversion) are simply not removable.
More importantly perhaps, what happens if the
permitted AUM's are reduced or the permit cancelled?
If the permit is cancelled, the regulations say that
the permittees shall receive fair market value for
their interest in the permanent range improvements.
This clause provides some security but outright
cancellation seldom occurs. The more typical case is a
reduction in the AUM's allowed. In this case, the
regulations make no provision whatever for any
compensation for investment lost in range improvements.
Given the long history of grazing reductions, the
pressures from other multiple users for increased use,
and the reluctance of agency officials to encourage
private improvements, the climate for private
investment on public ranges is not favorable.
Perhaps private investment is not needed if public
funds can produce the efficient quantity of range
improvements. FLPMA stipulates that one-half of all
grazing fees collected by the government shall be used
for range improvements. These are called "range
betterment" funds and half of them go to the district
or region where they were generated via fees, and the
other half may be used anywhere on the public lands for
range rehabilitation at the discretion of the Secretary
of Interior.
Two points deserve attention. If it is in fact
true that rates of return to range improvement are
higher than comparable rates earned by the resources in
their best alternative uses, then this formula
allocation would automatically provide investment funds
and would be economically efficient. This assumes that
the funds were not dollar-for-dollar offset by reduced
appropriations for range improvement. I would doubt
that the probability is high that such a perfect match
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has occurred; thus, formula allocation may have
increased the flow of funds for range improvement.
Still, investment by formula is always dangerous on
efficiency grounds since funds are directed to given
purposes and even certain geographical locations
regardless of relative economic yields. The Bureau
evidently does not have the flexibility to rank all
range improvement projects by net economic yield and
then allocate these funds on a project-by-project
basis, by descending yields, until the funds are
exhausted. This procedure would almost surely produce
more efficient investments than any allocation
formula.
The reason that formula allocation was initiated is
probably found in equity considerations. If there are
benefits to be captured by range improvement and
grazing fees are the sources of the funds, then why not
give the benefits to those who paid the fees? Good
equity reasoning! The fit is not perfect, the
improvements are not made on the exact ranches in
proportion to fees paid, but half the funds do filter
down to the state and the district of their generation.
This rule may make it more palatable politically to
raise fees to fair market value as required in recent
legislation and as strongly advocated by 0MB since the
ranchers appear to be getting some of them back in the
form of range improvement benefits.
In sum, once again efficiency of resource
allocation is probably sacrified on the altar of
equity.
Economic Analysis in the Bureau of Land Management
I do not consider myself sufficiently informed
about the Bureau's needs for social and economic
analysis relative to its capabilities for meeting these
needs to give more than a cursory and probably naive
discussion of this topic. Other scholars following me
in this workshop will probe more deeply, I trust, and
Workshop 6 will be devoted largely to the legal,
·
political, and social setting within which the Bureau
operates its programs. Still, the above
notwithstanding, a few comments will be given to
complete the discussion of the role of economic
analysis in the Bureau.
Benefit-cost (B-C) analysis formally has been
performed in the BLM since 1976 in an effort to improve
the productivity of rangeland investments. Two very
recent documents, dated March 3 and March 11, 1981
explain clearly the goals to be pursued and the
procedures to be used in economic and social analysis.
The documents are Instruction Memorandum 81-296 and
Instruction Memorandum 81-315, and I regard them as
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clear and forceful statements. For the most part the
economic analysis advocated is sound. They deserve
careful attention and study, and ultimate
implementation should improve analysis in the Bureau by
an order of magnitude.
Apparently they are to be regarded for the moment
as tentative and experimental. To quote from the
Director's letter attached to 81-296, "This policy is
issued as interim guidance. It is to be applied and
used by all field offices. We will request a report by
about January 15, 1982, from each office on ways this
policy can be improved so that we can prepare a final
policy by March 1, 1982." In the spirit of trying to
be helpful, I will raise a few questions on procedures
that seem to me to be flawed, while leaving unsupported
a much larger set of issues with with I am in
agreement.
B-C analysis will be performed on improvements
required to implement new Allotment Management Plans
(AMP's). The following instructions are given:
No single criterion can serve as a indicator of
the efficient use of Federal investment funds
and as a measure of sustained yield and
multiple use criteria in the Federal Land
Policy and ·Management Act of 1976. To capture
the essence of national policy guidance, we
have aggregated national concerns into two
categoriesi economic efficiency and
environmental quality • • • The B/C ratio will
be used as an initial screen to determine
economic feasibility. Allotments will then be
ranked on the basis of a modified B/C ratio.
The environmental quality criterion will be
used to rank the allotments in terms of their
current ecological productivity and stability,
employing the acreage in the allotment that is
in poor ecological condition as the measure of
quality.
It is later indicated in the memorandum that poor
ecological condition is a description of the
successional state of the allotment in relation to
climax range condition.
The decision process calls for a B-C screeni i.e.,
if the allotment investment plan does not produce a B/C
ratio of unity or better," adjustments in design,
scope, or nature of proposed investments can be made in
an attempt to improve the B/C ratio, consistent with
mangement objectives." (BLM 81-296). Then all
allotments will be ranked by B/C ratios. Even if an
allotment investment program has a B/C ratio less than
unity," • • • B-C analyses may be waived in a situation
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where an improvement is needed to prevent severe loss
to public or private resource values."
Allotments are also ranked by the environmental
quality criterion; i.e., acres in poor ecological
condition. Then the average of the rankings of the B/C
ratio and the ecological condition determines priority
of investment.
Several aspects of this procedure might be
questioned. In principle, I am quite prepared to grant
that ecological condition is a legitimate criterion for
investment considering the mandates of recent
legislation. The problem is how to consider it without
opening the floodgates to admit any project that the
range manager or any private user may feel strongly
about for a number of possible reasons and thus
eliminate the efficacy of any objective standard.
There are opportunities aplenty in the procedures for
doing just this. The B-C analysis can be waived
altogether if the ecological condition is deemed poor
enough. And, to rank allotments on the ecological
condition criterion by the acreage in poor condition
would seem to favor the large allotments, all other
things equal, and I can see no logical justification
for this. In short, there are too many qualifications
to the rigorous application of a B-C test or screen.
No wonder 0MB often appears to lack confidence in the
procedures of BLM as an effective test of economic or
financial feasibility.
I cannot offer a perfect alternative given the
mandates of the legislation. But I believe that formal
incorporation of ecological benefits and costs in the
B-C framework and then use of the ratio as a definitive
screen would be preferable on economic efficiency
grounds to the Bureau's outlined procedures.
Another problem is the use of the allotment as the
analytical and accounting unit for B-C calculations.
Admittedly, the AMP is the core of the Bureau's range
improvement program and management plan. But I fail to
see why this requires that range improvement
.
feasibility be reckoned on an allotment-by-allotment
basis. The physical boundaries of range improvement
projects would seldom if ever coincide with allotment
boundaries if they are most efficiently designed.
After all, the allotment is simply a convenient range
unit for management and administrative purposes. Why
not do the benefit-cost accounting on a
project-by-project basis? The myriad of factors
affecting range productivity on an entire allotment
would then not confound and obscure the benefits and
costs of a single investment project plan. The
important analytical consideration is to include the
entire benefits and costs of a project, public and
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private, wherever and to whomever they occur.
Allotment accounting does not appear to accomplish this
need.
I have one additional problem with the recommended
procedure. Memorandum 81-296 discusses the criterion
of National Economic Efficiency and states:
The B/C ratio will be used as an initial
screen, to determine-economic:.:feasibility.
Allotments will then be ~anked on the basis of
total benefits/Federal costs. The effect of
subtracting private cost (including
contributions) from the denominator will be to
increase the value of the B/C ratio and improve
the posit ion of. that~llotment--3.n ±.he -ranking.
This approach will provide an incentive for
user contributions and increase the
effectiveness of Federal rangeland improvement
expenditures.
Yes, this procedure will improve B/C ratios and will
give priority to investments that maximize the returns
per dollar of Federal expenditures. That goal may be
of some interst to 0MB. But as a criterion to indicate
national economic efficiency, i.e., to maximize the
benefits per dollar of scarce resources used, public
and private, it is obviously badly flawed. And why
should subtracting private cost provide incentives for
private participation? Private participation will be
influenced by the benefits received by the contributor
per dollar of his contribution, not the benefits per
dollar of federal contribution. In sum, for purposes
of indicating efficient resource use implied by the
national economic efficiency criterion, benefits should
be shown in relation to all :investment costs, public
and private. BLM already argues that all benefits
should be counted, not just those captured by the
federal treasury. To be consistent all costs must be
counted as well.
This brings me to my final point. It, must be
obvious that the demands on the Bureau's economists and
sociologists are enormous.
At the Washington level there are tremendous needs
to satisfy the efficiency and equity implications of
BLM policy in land-use planning, forage allocation,
administering the permit system, setting grazing fees,
estimating market and nonmarket values for outputs and
inputs, developing guidelines for range improvement
appraisal, and a host of other related issues. At the
state and district level are the onerous requirements
of the mandated EIS's,-··and the AMP's.·-I -have not ~ven
mentioned mitigation studies, the subject of Professor
Martin's paper.
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Only administrators in the "Bureau-can-1cnow in any
definitive way whether the capability in the Bureau
matches what I consider to be a staggering load. The
issues are as complex as those faced by economists and
social scientists .in any public agency, :or anywhere
else for that .matter~ ...and their.resolution will require
competence and training of the highest order.
As I understand the numbers, there are five
economists and tw.o ..sociologist.s working at the
Washington level in the Bureau, but nonexclusively on
range problems. Many are also working on minerals,
energy, and forestry as well. At the state level,
approximately twenty economists and twelve sociologists
are working in the Bureau, and most of them do not have
Ph.D. --degrees. --At .the .iii.strict- level, --=there .are
approximately the same number as at the state level
with about the same level of training. Since there are
ten state offices and fifty-six district offices, the
Bureau does not have all the districts covered with
economists and social scientists, and the state people
must be spread awfully thin.
My perception is that most of the effort of
economists and sociologists in the BLM consists of busy
work associated with mandated EIS's, ex post facto
justification of range improvement projects and
acquiring heaps of information in attempts to get the
public involved in the decision process. Left undone
is the really solid economic and social analysis of the
bureau's policies in terms of their impact on the
community. For the economists, this would
include efficiency and equity studies and for the
sociologists, social impact analysis.
This cavalier look at the agency and its problems,
and the growing importance and controversy of economic
and social issues, prompt me to wonder if there should
not be some transfer of man-years from the technical,
range management side to the economic-social side. In
addition, it is quite obvious to me that the Bureau's
difficult and complex economic and social problems
require and deserve the best trained professionals
available.
Recommendations
The Bureau should give serious consideration to the
following recommendations which are derived from the
above discussion.
1) Multiple use management must be buttressed by
solid empirical analyses that attempt to evaluate the.
multiple products taken from the public lands and
estimate their costs. This should put the land

24

allocation and forage allocation decisions in a more
systematic, quantitative, and objective framework.
2) More resources should be devoted to economic
and social analysis at all levels, even if it means
transferring some frorn traditional range -managements
uses. I emphasize the importance of analysis~s
contrasted with much of the descriptive work now being
done.
3) Since they are-inefficient-in allocating
grazing, eligibility requirements for holding
preferences such as prior-use, commensurability, and
ownership of land and water, should be eliminated
unless it can be conclusively shown that such action
would have .a disrupting, _chaotic ....effect .on. the industry
and the local economy. -ffhis would-free ~the -permits
from any appurtenant land, water, or livestock and
allow unrestricted transfer at whatever negotiated
prices the market would dictate.
4) To the extent practicable, all direct users of
the public lands should particpate in paying fees that
would defray at least administrative and management
costs.
5) If grazing preferences are reduced on a fairly
permanent basis, permittees should be compensated
proportionately for their interest in permanent range
improvements just as they are for cancellation of
privileges.
6) Create incentives for private investment in
range improvement by devising an evaluation system for
changes in grazing capacity that will be credible to
ranchers. Included must be a guarantee that ranchers
can take the AUM's of increased grazing capacity.
7) B-C ratios for evaluating range improvements
should be calculated on the basis of all investment
costs and benefits, private and government.
8) B-C analysis should be done on a project basis
rather than on an allotment basis.
9) Environmental concerns should be incorporated
into B-C analysis directly rather than used as a
separate ranking device for project selections.
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